Conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory do not explain the St. Petersburg paradox. To do so, the power coefficient of an individual's utility function must be lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function.
Back to the St. Petersburg paradox?
The St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738) refers to a lottery L that delivers an outcome n 2 with probability n − 2 , ∈ n ù. The maximum price that an individual is willing to pay for L is finite and typically low. However, L has an infinite expected value. Thus, the St.
Petersburg paradox is generally taken as evidence against expected value and in favor of expected utility theory (EUT). Samuelson (1977) offers an extensive survey of the St. Petersburg paradox.
Arguably the dominant descriptive decision theory today is cumulative prospect theory or CPT (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) . CPT accommodates a large amount of experimental data including robust violations of EUT such as the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953 ( ) ( )
It follows from (2) that according to CPT an individual obtains a bounded utility from lottery L only when γ α < i.e. when the sum on the right hand side of (2) is convergent. Thus, CPT explains the St. Petersburg paradox only when the power coefficient of an individual's utility function is lower than the power coefficient of an individual's probability weighting function.
Intuitively, an individual's utility function must not simply be concave but it must be concave relative to an individual's probability weighting function to avoid the St. Petersburg paradox. In all studies from table 1 except for Camerer and Ho (1994) and Wu and Gonzalez (1996) the estimated best fitting CPT parameters are γ α > , which implies a divergent sum on the right hand side of equation (2). Thus, conventional parameterizations of CPT predict that an individual is willing to pay up to infinity for the St. Petersburg lottery L . This paradoxical result occurs because a conventional inverse S-shaped probability weighting function overweights small probabilities too much for a mildly concave utility function to offset this effect.
Apparently, the parameterization of CPT that accommodates best the available experimental evidence does not explain the oldest and the most famous paradox in decision theory-the St. Petersburg paradox. To accommodate the St. Petersburg paradox CPT must be estimated together with a restriction γ α < on its parameters. However, it is not obvious if a restricted version of CPT remains descriptively superior to other decision theories. 
